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Rural development policy and the provision of public goods: 
challenges for evaluation  
Slee B. and Thomson K. 
 
Abstract 
Environmental “public goods” generated by agricultural land use are discussed in terms of 
their conceptual underpinnings and how they have been addressed to date in European Union 
policy for agriculture and rural development. The current debate on CAP reform has intensified 
the already considerable debate over how these goods should be valued, and how the relevant 
policy measures should be evaluated. Against this background, a number of methodological and 
practical  issues  for  evaluation  are  discussed,  including  accounting  for  spatial  scale  and 
diversity,  the  estimation  of  use  and  non-use  values,  governance,  potential  conflict  between 
“public  goods”  and  their  marketisation,  and  accounting  for  the  marginal  effects  of  rural 
development policy on environmental assets and their values. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
There is now widespread recognition of the existence and importance of public goods 
associated with rural land use at both theoretical level and in policy discourse.  In addition to 
providing food and fibre, primary rural land use is implicated in the co-provision of many other 
goods and services which create value for society but are not normally fully accounted for in 
sectoral or national accounts.  At the same time, certain types of land use are implicated in 
certain damaging outcomes, for example in biodiversity and water quality decline, and these too 
are  not  normally  accounted  for  in  standard  economic  budgets.  These  features  have  been 
emphasised by the shift towards a consumption orientation in the rural economy (e.g. Slee 2005; 
Cloke et al. 2006) and the influx of incomers seeking rural amenity in various forms, including 
landscape, wildlife and from residency. 
This  paper  focuses  on  an  examination  of  environmental  public  goods  generated  by 
agricultural land use and how they have been addressed to date in European farm policy, how 
they might be provided for by a reformed farm policy and, in particular, how the evaluation 
challenge in policies for their provision might be addressed with respect to both effectiveness 
and efficiency as components of rural development policy. The focus in this paper is on the 
environmental public goods created by farming activity (essentially Axis 2 measures) and their Ancona - 122
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role in rural development.  Using the terminology of the ecosystem services framework, the 
environmental public goods comprise supporting, regulating and cultural ecosystem services
1. 
2.  WHEN IS A PUBLIC GOOD A PUBLIC GOOD? 
At times, there appears to be a gulf between the loose definition of a public good in lay 
discourse  and the  more  formal  definition  in  economics.    In  political  debate  (e.g.  European 
Commission, 2010)
2, the term “public benefits” is sometimes used as an apparent synonym, 
although this may mean simply the value of goods and services available to all members of 
society. The European Parliament adopted its report (Lyon, 2010) on CAP reform only after 
amending the definition of “public good” to include “food security and food safety”, which 
some (e.g. IEEP, 2010) regard as “unhelpful”. The adjective “public” certainly does (or should) 
not mean “government-provided”, although regulation and/or funding by state authorities is 
often implied. Again, the extent of the “public” population(s) able to enjoy the good or service 
is  seldom  closely  defined;  this  may  vary  from  local  residents  or  a  specialist  group  (e.g. 
birdwatchers) to the global population as in the case of carbon sequestration. In between, there 
are  “publics”  which  may  be  regional  but  perhaps  distant  (e.g.  in  a  town  receiving  water 
supplies) or national (tax-paying) or EU in extent. 
The textbook definition of a public good (Sloman 1994: 417) is of a good (or service) that 
has  the  characteristics  of  non-rivalry  and  non-excludability  in  consumption.  In  contrast,  a 
private good is both excludable and rival in consumption. Non-rivalry and non-excludability 
make impossible the preservation of property rights (e.g. the enjoyment of the good or service), 
and hence also the establishment of a market between buyers (consumers, beneficiaries) and 
sellers  (providers). Without  such  a  market  and  its prices,  supply  by  providers,  who  cannot 
extract  payment  from  consumers,  is  likely  to  be  less  than  socially  optimal  given  the 
(unrevealed) demand characteristics of those consumers, who can enjoy the public good without 
cost, at least to themselves. 
A  distinction  is  often  made  between  a  pure  public  good  when  the  above  defining 
characteristics are in no way compromised and quasi-public goods in which some of these 
characteristics are only partially fulfilled. The classic textbook examples of pure public goods 
include the services provided by street lighting, a police force or a defence force.  In such 
circumstances,  consumption  is  non-rival,  and  one  person’s  use  does  not  exclude  another.  
Quasi-public goods and services for which consumption may be limited to certain social groups 
(e.g. local residents) or where one person’s use partly limits that of others (e.g. by congestion) 
are common with respect to rural land use, as in ‘club goods’. In practice, there is a continuum 
                                                       
 
 
1 Because of their cultural character, some measures could be construed as belonging to Axis 3 or 4 
2 In the cited reference, “Objective 2” of a “future CAP” is proposed as “to guarantee sustainable production practices and secure 
the  enhanced  provision  of  environmental  public  goods  as  many  of  the  public  benefits  generated  through  agriculture  are  not 
remunerated through the normal functioning of markets” [bold in original; underlining added].  Ancona - 122
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of goods from purely public to purely private, and, as one moves from public good to market 
good, the commercialisation (or marketisation; see below) opportunities increase.  
The prevalent public goods in European farming relate to the environment and cultural 
co-products  of  farming  systems.    They  include  the  biodiversity  found  in  agro-ecosystems, 
including – perhaps especially - that found in the fringe habitats provided by areas of unfarmed 
land and field boundaries within agricultural holdings, the visual cultural landscape of fields and 
farm buildings, and the cultural values associated with an identification of farming people with 
particular places.  More contentiously, food security has been considered by some as a public 
good, not least because food security can so easily act as a screen for protectionist policies. 
On the widely held assumption that farmed landscapes and farmland biodiversity are a 
public good, it seems probable that these are inherently more accessible where there are rights 
enabling ready access to farmland, especially where use values prevail over non-use values.  
Consequently, where the road and housing network is dense so that visibility and access are 
enhanced, or where there are public rights to public outdoor access over land as in Nordic 
countries and Scotland, the value extracted from the direct use of the public goods provided by 
land use is likely to be much greater than in countries where land is less accessible and/or there 
is no such general right of unimpeded public access exists.  Whether or not an environmental 
feature is a public good or a private good is determined at least in part by the disposition of 
property rights, as well as the inherent features of the good or service under scrutiny.   
This issue of property rights takes on even greater significance when dealing with some 
of  the  negative  externalities  arising  from  farming,  such  as  loss  of  biodiversity  in  modern 
agriculture.  If the state has a property right of/over a given level of e.g. biodiversity, a loss of 
biodiversity would theoretically best be addressed by a financial penalty to farmers causing a 
loss of that public good of biodiversity.   However, establishing a “given level”, and ascribing 
losses to the actions or inactions of a particular producer, may be difficult. If there is uncertainty 
about the right, there is no case for a penalty to the farmer for even a loss of biodiversity.  
Conversely, in response to under-provision of an identified agri-connected public good, there is 
a prima facie strong case for a reward for managing land in ways to provide additional amounts 
of that good.  Such rewards for threshold levels of environmental services fit closely with the 
GAEC provisions of the single farm payment. 
The  European  Network  for  Rural  Development  (2010)  identified  three  types  of  rural 
development measures used to encourage the provision of public good associated with RDP 
measures: 
·  Area-based payments incentivising land management practices that benefit soils, water 
quality,  habitats  and  species,  carbon  management,  as  well  as  the  maintenance  of  the 
landscape – for example the agri-environment, the natural handicap and the Natura 2000 
measures; 
·  Support for capital investments that can be used, for example, to provide assistance with 
the costs of introducing environmentally sustainable technologies and infrastructure on 
farms (e.g. the farm modernisation measure), in relation to the agricultural sector more Ancona - 122
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generally  (e.g.  the  infrastructure  development  and  the  adding  value  to  agricultural 
products measures), as well as to support the creation of new business opportunities, 
services  and  other  activities  in  rural  areas  more  generally,  such  as  maintaining  and 
promoting the natural heritage, supporting farm diversification, or tourism activities (e.g. 
the diversification, basic rural services, conservation and upgrading of rural heritage and 
investment in tourism measures); 
·  Investments in advice and training for land managers as well as capacity building for 
people in rural communities (e.g. advice and training measures as well as the use of the 
Leader approach to deliver rural development actions). 
In the remainder of this paper, we concentrate on the not inconsiderable challenge of 
addressing how to evaluate the rural development impacts of measures to support the provision 
of environmental public goods (Bradley et al, 2010). 
3.  HOW EUROPEAN POLICY HAS SUPPORTED AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC GOODS 
The original five objectives of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) may be argued 
to have included public goods in their mention of “stabilis[ing] markets” and the “availability 
[= security?] of [food] supplies”, and even in the implied objective of preserving a significant 
rural  population  with  its  cultural  traditions  and  social  support  capability  (Tracy  1989),  as 
demonstrated  more  recently  in  the  early  years  of  transition  in  several  Central  European 
countries.  However, the policy response to agriculturally induced environmental degradation 
and support for environmental public goods post-dated the formation of the CAP, and was a 
response to a Northern European critique of the effects of the CAP on the environment (e.g. 
Bowers and Cheshire 1983). 
A clearer declaration of support for public goods came with Article 130R of the 1986 
Single  European  Act,  which  specified:  “Environmental  protection  requirements  shall  be  a 
component  of the  Community’s  other policies”, including,  of  course,  the  CAP.   The  Birds, 
Habitats  and  Water  Framework  Directives  have  required  Member  States  to  obey  this 
requirement as regards the protection of listed species, wildlife habitats and water.  Further, 
since the introduction of the first area-specific agri-environmental measures in the late 1980s, 
European expenditure on this field of activity has been mainstreamed and is a key feature of 
rural development programmes, necessarily giving Member States a great deal of discretion in 
how the support is spent. In the 1990s, the MacSharry reforms saw the EU-wide implementation 
of “accompanying measures”, and the Agenda 2000 reforms to the CAP installed Pillar 2 are a 
component of the CAP budget - equal in nature if not in size to Pillar 1 – in which “rural 
development” policy was seen to include major support for agri-environmental measures carried 
out by farmers, for the implicit purpose of providing public goods. 
The Commission’s November 2010 proposals (COM(2010) 672) for further CAP reform 
included several references to “public goods”, and to “challenges” in the form of food security 
(in terms of capacity, quality and variety), the environment (e.g. soils, water, air, biodiversity) 
and climate change, and territorial balance. In addition, the CAP should contribute to the EU Ancona - 122
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2020 strategy of smart (i.e. innovative), sustainable and inclusive “green” growth. To achieve 
these objectives, the Commission proposes that direct payments be redistributed, redesigned and 
targeted, with a number of components including (i) a “green” component payable for “simple, 
generalised non-contractual and annual agri-environmental actions such as permanent pasture, 
green  cover,  crop  rotation  and  ecological  set-aside,  possibly  with  enhanced  GAEC;  (ii) 
additional income support on an area basis for regions “with specific natural constraints”, with 
optional national top-ups on a voluntary basis; this would take the place of the current LFA 
subsidy scheme; and (iii) a simplified but not watered-down cross-compliance system. 
Depending on the balance (which would vary from country to country, and from region to 
region) of these different components, these proposals represent a significant “greening” of 
Pillar 1, i.e. a strengthening of its Payment for Environmental Services (PES) character, even if 
these services need further definition.  With the exception of the above “voluntary” components 
above, the proposals do not mention a change in the funding basis of Pillar 1, so that the PES 
approach  would  be  confined  to  these  additional  components,  and  to  their  application,  e.g. 
national  definitions  of  strengthened  GAEC  and  of  a  new  definition  of  “areas  with  specific 
natural constraints”.  The Commission is also promoting organic farming – which might be 
considered as providing bundled public goods as well as market-valued ecosystem services – as 
a feature of this new system (Haniotis, AES Conference, London, 16 December 2010). 
The Commission’s proposals for the rural development Pillar 2 of the CAP are much less 
worked out in the November 2010 document than those for Pillar 1. They seem  mostly to 
confirm the current Axis-based structure, though without much mention of the 2008 Health 
Check  “new  challenges”  of  water  management  and  climate  change.    A  “risk  management 
toolkit” for farm income stabilisation is proposed (even though this seems more suited to Pillar 
1),  and  possibly  some  “redistribution  of  funds  between  Member  States  based  on  objective 
criteria”.  Greater targeting is advocated, though without extra administrative costs. 
The GAEC principle is built on the idea that basic level of public good provision (or 
reduced levels of public bads) should be expected as a precondition of receipt of a single farm 
payment.  Above that threshold level of payment, additional provision of environmental goods 
and services should be based on compensation for opportunity foregone. Article 39 of Council 
Regulation  (EC)  1698/2005  specifies  that:  “Agri-environment  payments  shall  be  granted  to 
farmers [and to other land managers where justified] who make on a voluntary basis agri-
environmental commitments.”  Such payments may only be made to cover commitments going 
beyond  mandatory  requirements,  and  “shall  cover  additional  costs  and  income  foregone 
resulting from the commitment made. Where necessary, they may cover also transaction cost.” 
These specifications makes it clear that agri-environmental payments under RDPs are to be 
calculated on the basis of actual or implied costs incurred by farmers (and not, apparently, by Ancona - 122
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other  land  owners  and  users)  rather  than  on  the  basis  of  the  social  values  placed  on  the 
ecosystem services provided by the “commitments” made
3.  
From an economic point of view, the Regulation places Member State governments in the 
position of a perfectly discriminating monopsonist, i.e. as the single purchaser of the ecosystem 
services in question, who is able to offer different prices (payments) to different sellers, thus 
lowering its expenditure, and depriving sellers of “surplus” economic rent.  Such an approach 
relies  on  accurate  information  about  the  relevant  costs  and  revenues  (or  unpriced  values) 
involved.  Such information is hard to obtain and to verify, particularly when it is likely to 
fluctuate  over  time,  along  perhaps  with  the  unit  values  involved.  However,  with  renewed 
emphasis on “targeting” within both Pillars, greater attention in evaluation (see below) will have 
to be paid to how this is done, both in designing targeted schemes, and in implementing them. 
4.  THE EVALUATION CHALLENGE: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
The  evaluation  of  the  RDP  is  now  increasingly  guided  by  principles  and  supporting 
documentation from the European Commission and associated structures such as the European 
Evaluation  Network  for  Rural  Development
4.  The  Common  Monitoring  and  Evaluation 
Framework  (CMEF)  (European  Commission,  2006)  lays  down  evaluation  principles  and 
procedures.  With  the  help  of  a  limited  number  of  common  indicators  applicable  to  each 
programme, the defined evaluation framework should be applied in the course of ongoing, mid-
term  and  ex  post  evaluations.  While  the  possibility  to  apply  different  methodologies  for 
assessing impacts remains, the European Commission and its supporting structures such as the 
European Evaluation Network for Rural Development have launched a number of activities in 
order  to  support  programme  authorities  and  evaluators  in  implementing  the  ambitious 
framework.  Explanatory  notes  and  guidelines  further  clarify  methodological  challenges.  A 
thematic working group has recently explored “Approaches for assessing the impacts of the 
Rural Development Programmes in the context of multiple intervening factors” and “Capturing 
impacts of Leader and of measures to improve Quality of Life in rural areas”
5.   
Against this background, two fundamental conceptual issues underpin any evaluation of 
the impacts of agricultural public goods on rural development. First, given the diversity of 
agriculture  and  other  rural  land  uses  across  rural  Europe  and  the  diverse  environmental 
consequences of farming practice - sometimes creating positive externalities and sometimes 
negative - the level of public good provision will vary greatly from place to place.  Second, the 
value of these public goods will be influenced both by their intrinsic character and by the values 
                                                       
 
 
3 There have been recent calls for a modified interpretation of the “income foregone” principle: “the correct “income forgone” for 
scaling support in the [English] Uplands should be reinterpreted in line with the economic concept of opportunity cost, which is the 
income from the best alternative. This would generally be an occupation away from upland farming” (CLA, 2010). 
4 The European Evaluation Network for Rural Development provides support for improving the quality of evaluation of Rural 
Development  Programmes  (RDPs)  in  Member  States  of  the  European  Union  in  the  period  2007-2013.  See 
http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/evaluation/ 
5 See publications on http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/evaluation/ Ancona - 122
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given them by those who reside amongst them or visit them. It is therefore probable that land 
managers  in  areas  with  high  levels  of  agricultural  public  goods  are,  ceteris  paribus, 
beneficiaries of the movement of often affluent people and their spending power from cities into 
their hinterlands and beyond. 
There are a number of dimensions to the evaluation challenge.  Accurate estimation of the 
highly  spatially  heterogeneous  values  of  environmental  public  goods  is  needed.  This  must 
include spatially explicit public good valuation, but such efforts must overcome the challenge of 
estimating substitution effects (essentially cross-elasticities of demand with respect to different 
environmental public goods – some of which may exhibit trade-offs with each other in supply, 
e.g.  carbon  sequestration  and  biodiversity).    Some  values,  particularly  public  good  values 
relating to culture, may be especially hard to enumerate.  It may also be important to distinguish 
between  the  public  good  values  associated  with  farming  and  those  arising  from  inherent 
landscape  features  such  as  water  or  relative  relief.    The  question  of  how  to  create 
‘agglomeration economies’ in public good delivery also raises challenges.  Finally, the issue of 
‘secondary marketisation’ is explored.  These challenges are considered in turn. 
4.1. Accurate estimation of use values and non-use values 
Over  the  last  30  years,  the  ability  to  estimate  non-market  values  has  improved 
considerably.  The methods have been widely reviewed elsewhere (Bateman et al. 2002), and 
there is now considerable confidence that the non-market values of certain specified attributes 
and sometimes bundles of attributes can be estimated with reasonable accuracy.  There are 
broadly two groups of methods; those based on revealed preferences, amongst which the travel 
cost  method  is  the  most  widely  used;  and  the  expressed  preference  approach,  using  either 
contingent valuation (CV) or choice experiment (CE) models.  The latter group of methods are 
used where there is a desire to measure both use and non-use elements of value. 
Many studies of agri-environmental public goods have been based on applications of such 
methods but, for a variety of reasons, estimates of values in one place cannot be reliably used to 
estimate  the  overall  value  across  a  region  or  country  of  that  particular  attribute.    The  CV 
approach has now been applied for several decades, but often with unsatisfactory results either 
for  specific  sites  or  for  general  use.  For  specific  sites  (or  species,  etc.),  there  are  many 
methodological problems, including biases of various types likely to arise in over-estimation 
(e.g. González-Sepúlveda and Loomis, 2010). More generally, transferability of values between 
sites (or species) seems very difficult (EEA, 2010; Oglethorpe et al., 2000).  
The  estimation  of  the  environmental  outcomes  of  policy  measures  is  problematic.  
Without  core  biophysical  data  economic  valuation  of  public  goods  cannot  be  undertaken.  
FERA (2009) elaborate a framework for collecting environmental outcomes from the 2007-13 
RDP in Scotland, but the required budget for delivering the required information is greater than 
the total allocation for the MTE in Scotland.  Ancona - 122
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4.2. Capacity for spatially explicit measurement of benefits 
The  capacity  for  spatially  explicit  determination  of  value  is  constrained  both  by  the 
complexity and weak separability of the bundle of environmental services provided by farming 
practice  and  by  the  presence  of  potential  substitute  environmental  public  goods.    In  many 
situations,  so-called  ‘agricultural’  public  goods  arise  from  marginal  habitats  that  are  not 
cultivated, including wetlands or areas of woodland that are unconnected to farming practice, 
but are nonetheless part of the rural landscape.  These valued features may be relict elements of 
earlier  land  management  practices  such  as  hunting  copses  (small  woods  to  harbour  quarry 
species), shelter belts or moorland. 
Further, the presence of agricultural public goods may be less important to residents, 
recreationists  or  tourists  where  there  are  obvious  substitute  public  goods,  such  as  those 
delivered by commercial forestry, non-agricultural commons and heathlands, or in coastal areas 
associated with features such as dunes and estuaries.  In practice, the use values derived from 
agricultural public goods are likely to be much less where there are attractive coastlines or 
diverse forest areas than where farming is the overwhelmingly dominant land use over large 
areas of territory. 
4.3. Landscape scale needs and effects 
Whereas most interventions to support farming-related environmental public goods (or 
indeed  the  reduction  of  public  bads)  focus  on  the  individual  farm  holding  as  the  decision 
making entity, the challenge from an environmental perspective is often to generate landscape-
scale effects, when, as de Groot and Hein (2007) note, ‘ecological and institutional boundaries 
seldom coincide.’  Species often require habitats greater in size than that found on a single land 
management unit, and in consequence any strategy for that species needs to take a landscape-
scale approach.  Gimona (1999) notes ‘it is the preservation of ecological integrity, that is of 
processes on a number of scales, such as nutrient fluxes, ecological succession, exchanges of 
propagules, and disturbance which permits the existence of these (ecological) systems.’  Within 
specific landscapes, particular holdings may have especial value as key linkages in ecological 
corridors, particularly when more recent land management practices have resulted in habitat 
fragmentation.  The landscape scale approach is even more vital in water quality management, 
where one landowner can significantly compromise water quality over a large area. 
The requirement of public support for the delivery  of so-called environmental public 
goods in farming is premised on the assumption that they are public (in an economic theoretical 
sense) and that the land manager is unable to extract reward for their provision.  However, 
proxy markets (e.g. for housing) and market opportunities for businesses which are able to 
exploit recreational demands may challenge this assumption.  One may not be able to charge for 
accessing a landscape but it is possible to charge someone to stay in accommodation with 
spectacular views over that landscape and rentals and property values reflect this valorisation – 
or ‘secondary  marketisation’ (Slee  and Walker  1992)  -  of  the  environment into  marketable 
goods and services. Given the highly spatially variable nature of both population density and in-Ancona - 122
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migration  into  rural  areas  and  the  influence  of  environmental  public  goods  on  migration 
patterns, there may be considerable capacity to internalise the externality and create market 
goods associated with environmental quality (Saika and Beuret 1999). 
Where the value of environmental public goods is biased towards non-use values, the 
process  of  secondary  marketisation  cannot  occur,  unless  environmental  NGOs  (e.g. 
Conservation Amenity and Recreational Trusts or CARTS; Hodge and Dwyer 1996) enter the 
market place and offer contracts to land managers or acquire land and manage it for the co-
provision of both environmental and provisioning services.  Further, there may be considerable 
scope for the creation of new markets in environmental services both in communally owned and 
private forests (Merlo 1996; Mantau et al. 2001). Indeed, state-financed payment systems for 
the delivery of apparently public goods and services may stultify non-governmental payment 
systems. In such instances, the Lisbon Agenda of job creation and entrepreneurial innovation 
could be being displaced by unnecessary public subsidy. 
4.4. Governance and the delivery of environmental public goods 
Hodge  (1998)  argues  for  the  development  of  new  institutional  arrangements  which 
articulate  public  preferences  with  respect  to  environmental  goods  and  services  and  thereby 
ensure  their  delivery  in  the  reconstructed  market  place.    He  argues  that  ‘there  is  merit  in 
mechanisms  through  which  the  public are  given  an  opportunity  to express  and  reveal their 
preferences for alternative landscapes.’ The abstract merit of such an idea is challenged by the 
choice of spatial scale of the public(s) to be consulted and by the extent to which their wishes 
should  be  allowed  to  compromise  the  room  for  manoeuvre  of  land  managers  seeking  to 
maintain profitable rural enterprise.  The choice of spatial scale is critical.  It seems highly likely 
that the appropriate scale for engaging the public is the landscape tract in which they live, but 
such  an  approach  would  bump  into  wider  national  and  international  obligations  to  protect 
species and habitats in protected landscapes. 
As well as governance arrangements contemplating public engagement in establishing 
societal  preferences,  a  case  can  also  be  made  for  considering  appropriate  governance 
arrangements for the delivery of the environmental good or service in question.  There is some 
evidence that farmers prefer farmer-managed projects to top-down projects managed by public 
sector environmental bodies or environmental NGOs (Cerf et al., 1999; Blackstock et al., 2010).  
However, it is essential that local governance and the subsidiarity principle do not compromise 
higher level policy objectives in multi-level (and multi-sectoral) governance regimes. 
The  RuDI  project  (www.rudi-europe.net)  has  also  highlighted  the  importance  of 
governance  in  the  designing  and  implementing  the  current  set  of  RDPs.  Whether  the 
designers/implementers  are  centralised  or  decentralised,  and/or  sector-specific  (usually 
agricultural) or multi-sectoral, appears to make a difference to how fast RDPs are set up, and 
how successful they are in meeting their allocation targets (it is too early to assess whether these 
allocations are appropriate).  Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 10 of 14 
4.5. The links between rural development and public goods 
There are clearly some highly important links between the provision of public goods and 
rural development.  These connections arise through two processes both of which create an 
evaluative  challenge.    First,  the  choice  of  measures  selected  at  programme  level  under  the 
guidelines for the Rural Development Programmes can be explored with respect to their impact 
on  rural  development.    Second,  the  impact  of  environmental  quality  on  rural  economic 
development  can  be  explored,  including,  by  implication,  those  (marginal)  elements  of 
environmental quality contributed by the Programmes.  In both cases, evaluation should be 
guided by the CMEF principles.  Here we focus only on those measures connected to what 
might be termed environmental public goods. 
The contribution of RDP environmental public good measures to rural development arise 
through payments to farmers for the delivery of environmental goods and services. However, 
given  that  the  general  principle  of  payment  for  such  services  is  compensation  for  farming 
income foregone, the net effect on rural development might be expected to be neutral or at best 
small.  Indeed, such effects may even be negative if the level of agricultural activity is reduced 
and if there are reduced interactions of farming enterprise and the wider rural economy. If, 
however, the provider of the environmental service were to be compensated by its public good 
value, this could materially affect rural development prospects through an injection of additional 
income into areas where there was a high level of public good provision. 
The second way of exploring impacts is to consider the impact of environmental public 
good values on regional economies by examining the extent to which environmental quality 
attracts  in  economic  actors  as  residential  households  or  businesses.    Their  presence  is  a 
consequence of the environmental qualities of the area and the total economic activity arising 
can be estimated.  Slee et al. (2004) have attempted this with respect to forestry and suggested 
that the impact of the apparent public good values of forestry on regional development in an 
area of intensive farmland is considerably higher than the value of provisioning services derived 
from  forestry.    Such  work  requires  considerable  expertise  in  apportioning  the  impact  of 
environmental public goods on decisions by economic actors. 
5.  THE EVALUATION CHALLENGE: PRACTICAL ISSUES 
The size, shape and scope of EU rural development policy in the next programming 
period is still highly uncertain, due to (inter alia): the size of the overall EU budget; the share of 
the CAP within the overall EU budget; the relative shares of Pillars 1 and 2 within the CAP 
budget, and how these are determined for each Member State; the content of Pillar 2, i.e. its 
“Axes”  or  equivalents,  which  may  contract (e.g.  “losing”  Axis  3  to  the  Regional  Fund)  or 
expand (e.g. to include risk management tools); and the relationship of (the current) Axes 1 and 
2 to a reformed Pillar 1, i.e. how the “green” and “specific natural constraints” components of 
direct payments will fit alongside Pillar 2 schemes. RDP measures probably work best where 
they are closely aligned to other policy measures, such as the Water Framework Directive.  Ancona - 122
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Where this is the case, it is desirable that any indicators used in the CMEF should also be 
aligned to other desired policy outcomes. 
Although estimation of non-market values has improved dramatically, there are major 
difficulties  in  specifying  unit  values  for  environmental  goods  and  services  as  these  will 
necessarily be spatially variant, not just because of the geography of demand (proximity to 
conurbations etc.) but also because the demand for different environmental services may well 
differ across Europe, and between different stakeholders, e.g. land managers and the general 
public.  They  will  also  be  spatially  variant  because  of  the  availability  of  alternative 
environmental services- such as attractive coastlines, inland water features or forests.  Although 
the science of benefit transfer has improved, it seems unlikely in the short term that sufficiently 
accurate benefit transfer models can be developed. 
The level and range of natural and semi-natural environmental public goods associated 
with agriculture, such as biodiversity and landscape, seem much more restricted in areas of 
intensive farming, whereas they are higher in the extensive areas of low-intensity farming. On 
the other hand, the intensive areas are generally located nearer conurbations with their high 
populations, and thus may carry higher social values per unit (hectare, species, etc.), due to 
aggregate  demand  and  their  relative  scarcity.  The  value  of  wildlife  and  landscapes  in 
extensively farmed areas is probably lower per unit, and fewer people have easy use access to 
them. The balance of aggregate public-good value between these two (admittedly crude) types 
of  farmed  area  across  the  EU  is  thus  difficult  to  estimate,  and  further  so  is  the  relative 
importance of evaluation to be undertaken. In relation to forestry, similar conclusions may hold; 
woodlands near areas of high population are relatively scarce but carry high value per hectare in 
terms of public goods (including public outdoor access, and sometimes local climatic effects), 
while the (mainly coniferous) forests in remoter areas are likely to have lower values. 
Within any particular area, there will be variations in the intensity of farming and in the 
co-production of environmental services such as landscape and habitat. In general, it will be 
easier for the less intensive producer to respond positively to measures to support the enhanced 
provision of environmental goods and services not least because their land management systems 
are easier to adapt to such demands.  However, disinterest in environmental schemes among 
more intensive farmers may lead to a patchwork response and compromise the development of 
ecologic corridors. 
The  delivery  of enhancement to  rural land based  environmental  public  goods can  be 
undertaken in different ways. Governance structures mediate the acceptability of measures to 
promote environmental quality (Blackstock et al. 2010).  The development of new models of 
governance for the delivery of environmental enhancement may be crucial to their acceptability 
amongst land managers.  Accordingly, governance models need to be evaluated as well as the 
environmental outcomes. 
The  estimation  of  non-market  values  of  policy  measures  should  be  based  on  the 
increment  to  value  arising  from  the  policy  measure,  not  the  total  value  of  a  particular 
environmental feature. Often good baseline data are lacking, and the detailed assessment of Ancona - 122
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success (e.g. with the expansion of numbers of Biodiversity Action Plan species) creates a very 
high cost demand for field survey and data which it is almost impossible to fund adequately. 
The greatest difficulty with current and future evaluation is perhaps the challenge of 
measuring secondary marketisation and second and later round effects on rural development in a 
more widely conceived conception of rural development than the extant EC notion based on the 
well-being  of  rural  land  managers.  The  transfer  of  resources  into  rural  areas  because  of 
environmental quality is well recognised (Slee and Skerratt, 2010), as is the contribution of rural 
land use to that overall quality. The influx of new residents and tourists brings benefit not only 
to farmers but also to hoteliers and other rural service providers.  It is necessary to elicit the 
contribution of current rural land managers to that total environmental quality, alongside the 
contributions from relative relief, water features, archaeological features etc., and it is possible 
that in both lay and policy discourse the contribution of current rural land use may often have 
been exaggerated. 
We conclude that the evaluation challenge regarding the contribution of EU support for 
the provision of environmental public goods from farming is considerable.  Notwithstanding the 
benefits of the CMEF and the more strategic nature of rural development programmes, the 
accurate elicitation of rural development impacts of these measures to support the provision of 
environmental public goods is confronted by both theoretical and practical challenges.  It seems 
likely that current evaluation measures underestimate the economy wide effects of rural land-
based environmental public goods, but over-estimate the elicited non-market values.  We are 
still  some  distance  from  being  able  to  measure  regional  or  sub-regional  environmentally 
adjusted accounts with any accuracy, even if estimation procedures for some forms of non-
market goods and services have advanced considerably. 
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